Bolívar's campaign to liberate New Granada

Military campaign in Venezuelan War of Independence (1819–1820)

Bolívar's campaign to liberate New Granada
Part of the Colombian War of Independence and the Venezuelan War of Independence

The Battle of Boyaca by Martín Tovar y Tovar, 1890
Date27 May – 10 August 1819
Location
Eastern and Central Viceroyalty of New Granada
Result Liberation of New Granada by Independentists
Belligerents

Neogranadians

  • British Legions
Spain Spain
Commanders and leaders
Simón Bolívar
José Anzoátegui
Francisco Santander
Juan de Sámano
José María Barreiro
Francisco Jimenez
Strength
2,200 (1819) 4,500 (1819)
  • v
  • t
  • e
Colombian War of Independence
First Republic of New Granada (1810-1816)
Spanish reconquest (1815-16)
Bolívar's campaign (1819-1823)
  • v
  • t
  • e
Venezuelan War of Independence
First and Second Republics (1811-1814)
Spanish reconquest (1814-1816)
Stalemate (1816–1819)
Bolívar's campaign (1819-1823)

Bolívar's campaign to liberate New Granada also known as the Liberation Campaign of 1819 was part of the Colombian and Venezuelan wars of independence and was one of the many military campaigns fought by Simón Bolívar. Bolívar's victory in New Granada (today: Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama) secured the eventual independence of northern South America. It provided Bolívar with the economic and human resources to complete his victory over the Spanish in Venezuela and Colombia.[citation needed] Bolívar's attack on New Granada is considered one of the most daring in military history, compared by contemporaries and some historians to Hannibal's or Napoleon's crossing of the Alps in 1800 and José San Martín's Crossing of the Andes in 1817.[1][2]

Background

During the years 1815 and 1816, Spain had reconquered most of New Granada, after having deployed the Expeditionary Army of Costa Firme under the command of General Pablo Morillo from Spain in early 1815. This effort was also aided by General Juan de Samano and his royalist forces in the south of New Granada. After five years of de facto and official independence, Morillo reestablished Royalist government in Santa Fe, leaving Juan de Samano as Viceroy, and returned to Venezuela with the bulk of his army in late 1816.

By 1817, Bolívar had set up his headquarters in the Orinoco region in southern Venezuela. It was an area from which the Spaniards could not easily oust him.[citation needed] There he engaged the services of several thousand foreign soldiers and officers, mostly British and Irish, set up his capital at Angostura (now Ciudad Bolívar) and established liaisons with the revolutionary forces of the Llanos. This included one group of Venezuelan llaneros (cowboys) led by José Antonio Páez and another group of New Granadan exiles led by Colonel Francisco de Paula Santander, who was the commander of the remnant forces that made up the army of the United Provinces of New Granda and would join Bolivar's army. With these forces he began a campaign from Guyana, pushing Morillo westwards where his forces would reach the gates of Caracas, only to be turned back by Morillo at the 3rd Battle of La Puerta. With this defeat Boilvar retreated to the safety of Llanos of the Apure region. In early 1819, Morillo's forces penetrated the llanos of the Apure region with the goal of finishing off Bolivar. Bolivar defeated him at the Battle of Las Queseras del Medio in April, forcing Morillo to retreat to Calabozo, where he would stay to wait out the rain season.

Earlier, in August 1818, Bolivar had promoted Santander to Brigadier General and dispatched him to the Llanos of Casanare along with 1,200 muskets, uniforms, and other supplies, with the mission of creating and training a New Granadan army for a future campaign to liberate New Granada. As this area of New Granada was one of the few places where there was no Spanish presence, it harbored many of the New Granadans who had fled Morillo's reconquest. Santander was able to effectively organize this army, which eventually reached around 1,200 men.[citation needed]

By 1819, the young artillery Colonel José María Barreiro was the military commander of all royalist troops in New Granada, and counted with at least 4,500 trained soldiers of the III Division of the Expeditionary Army of Costa Firme scattered throughout the Kingdom.[citation needed] Since assuming command, his mission was both to attack and defend the kingdom against any rebel threat. As both Viceroy Samano and Morillo heard reports of Santander's efforts to organize an army in Casanare at the same time that Morillo penetrated the Apure region in Venezuela, Barreiro was instructed to attack Santander in Casanare. He deployed a force of 1,200 men 540 cavalry in March 1819, crossing the Andes and arriving in the llanos and reaching Pore in early April. This campaign was unsuccessful:[3] the Royalist Army became exhausted as it was badly prepared for the campaign and was constantly harassed by Patriot forces, which forced Barreiro to withdraw to Tunja as the rainy season set in.

The campaign

Bolívar conceived of the operation in late 1818 and early 1819 after the Congress of Angostura began its deliberations and had reappointed him president of Venezuela.[citation needed] If Bolívar could liberate New Granada, he would have a whole new base from which to operate against General Pablo Morillo, head of the royalist forces in the area and end the stalemate in Venezuela.[citation needed] Central New Granada held great promise since, unlike Venezuela, it had only been recently conquered by Morillo and it had a prior six-year experience of independent government.[citation needed] Royalist sentiment, therefore, was not strong.[citation needed] But it would be hard to take the initiative against the better prepared and better supplied royalist army.[citation needed] To surprise it, Bolívar decided to move during the rainy season, when the Llanos flooded up to a meter and the campaign season ended. Morillo's forces would be gone from the Llanos for months and no one would anticipate that Bolívar's troops would be on the move.[citation needed] The proposed route, however, was considered impassable, and therefore the plan understandably received little support from the Congress or from Páez.

Bolívar and Santander traversing the flooded Llanos by Jesús María Zamora.

On May 25, Bolivar set out with his Venezuelan troops from the town of Mantecal in the Apure region of Venezuela westwards towards Tame in New Granada (modern day Colombia) where he met up with the army General Santander had formed to combine their forces and then set off for the Andes. During the march from Venezuela to New Granada a considerable number of horses and pack mules were lost to the flooded Llanos where they drowned. On June 4 they crossed the Arauca River and reached Tame on June 12. Once there Bolivar began the organization of the combined army of 2,500 men with him as commander-in-chief and General Carlos Soublette as his Chief of staff. The army was organized into 2 Divisions, a Vanguard Division in the front of the army under the command of Brigadier General Francisco de Paula Santander, and a Rearguard Division, with the bulk of the army under the command of Brigadier General José Antonio Anzoátegui. Within this Rearguard Division was the British Legion under the command of Colonel James Rooke.[4][5] While at Tame, Bolivar and Santander conducted a war meeting in order to discuss which route the army would take to cross the Cordillera Oriental. While Bolivar had originally intended to take the route through La Salina pass, Santander disagreed with this and suggested taking the route through the Paramo de Pisba with Boilvar eventually agreeing with this recommendation.[6] The pass through the Paramo de Pisba was the shortest and the least defended route, however it was also the most difficult and treacherous but with the greatest chance of surprising Spanish forces as it was deemed impassable by Barreiro especially during the rain season.[7] With the forces that he and Santander had recruited in the Apure and Meta River regions now combined, set off on June 17, 1819.[8][9][10]

In order to reach the pass, the Patriot Army marched towards Morcote where the foothills of the Andes began and then to Paya where they climbed to the last town, called Pisba, before crossing the Paramo, where they reached the town of Socha on the other side of the Cordillera. The army's march usually began around 5 am as the early morning weather was much easier on the troops.[citation needed] The Vanguard division eventually reached Morcote on 26 June and on 27 June they marched towards Paya. The rearguard was usually a day's march behind the vanguard.[citation needed] It reached Morcote on the morning of 27 June.

Battle of Paya - 27 June

On 27 June, as the Patriot Vanguard approached the town of Paya, they spotted the presence of a Spanish Garrison guarding the town. This Spanish garrison of around 300 men was under the command of Major Juan Figueroa y Ladron. They were guarding the town because it was along the road that led to the main mountain pass at Labranzagrande. Santander then ordered the troops of the Cazadores Battalion to attack the Spanish force in order to clear the way for the rest of the army. The battle was short, as Figueroa ordered his troops to withdraw towards Labranzagrande when he realized that he was facing a larger force. He also cut the bridge towards that town, thinking that it was the intended route for the Patriot Army.[citation needed]

Crossing the Andes

With the path cleared, the army continued its march. However that same day 27 June, Bolivar and the rearguard reached Morcote. Doubts began to arise amongst the Venezuelans troops and officers (apart from Bolivar) about the feasibility of the campaign, due to the lack of sufficient clothing and supplies for the difficult mountain crossing.[11] Bolivar then convened a war council and sent a letter to Santander informing him of this, recommending that the army try crossing the Andes through Cucuta.[12] Santander then gathered his officers (who were mostly New Granadan like him[citation needed]) to discuss what should be done. He then sent a letter responding to Bolivar, writing that even if the rest of the army did not wish to continue, the Vanguard force would continue the campaign whilst there was the slightest chance of success.[13] Santander also countered Bolívar by saying that crossing the Andes through Cucuta would take far longer and that they would lose their element of surprise, allowing Barreiro to receive reinforcements from Venezuela.[14] The conviction and determination of the New Granadan officers inspired confidence in Bolivar and the Venezuelan officer corps and as a result of this he decided to continue the campaign.[14]

Bolívar's troops ascend the Cordillera Oriental
Bolivar crossing the Paramo de Pisba by Francisco Antonio Cano

As the army ascended from the hot and humid, flood-swept plains of Venezuela of New Granada they were greeted by the freezing cold of the icy mountain pass of the Páramo de Pisba, which reached an elevation of 3,960 meters (13,000 feet), through the Cordillera Oriental. After the hardships of wading through a virtual sea,[tone] the mostly llanero army was not prepared and poorly clothed for the cold and altitude of the mountains as well as the heavy rainfall they experienced.[15][16][17] Santander and the Vanguard division were able to weather the climate better as they were mostly from the Andes.[18]This force arrived in Socha on July 4 and sent back men to assist the struggling Rearguard in their crossing.[19][18] Anzoategui and the rearguard division began to cross the Paramo on July 5 and had spend the night on the plateau. Bolivar, who was with them, described the crossing: "That same day we entered the Paramo, while the weather was good, the troops suffered a lot from the cold and we lost all beasts of saddle and burden; It has been rare that one would make it."[20] The rearguard suffered heavily during the crossing as their troops were mostly men of the Llanos.[citation needed] During the night many froze to the death due to the scarcity of vegetation in the area preventing the building of fires for warmth.[21] The rearguard eventually descended on 6 July. General Soublette, who was still in Paya, informed Bolivar that the British Legion would cross on the 13th. During the crossing, 100 men had perished and a number of soldiers had deserted.[22][23]In Socha, some 500 men were hospitalized and had to be cared for by the townsfolk.[citation needed] Santander commented on the sorry state of the army, stating that "the army was a dying body."[24][25]

Barreiro's reaction

Colonel Jose Maria Barreiro circa 1818

Since June 1819, the Spanish had received intelligence that Bolívar was possibly on the move.[26] However, the Spanish doubted that Bolívar's army could make the trip during the rainy season.[27] Barreiro who had been garrisoned in Tunja since May was informed about the reunion of Bolivar and Santander in Tame on July 25 and their intentions of penetrating central New Granada, the same day he informed Viceroy Juan de Samano of the situation. He then considered several paths through which Bolívar could cross the mountains: La Salina, Paya (Pisba), Pueblo Viejo, Medina, Miraflores, Tenza valley and Cáqueza. He discarded the first four, considering them too difficult and costly in human lives, especially in the winter season. He also ruled out penetration through Cáqueza, because it was located too far to the south. He assumed that Bolívar would choose the one in the Tenza Valley as the most appropriate and sent a number of force there to guard the pass.[28]

Barreiro's soon found himself in a difficult situation: he did not dare to cross the mountain range and attack Bolívar, because he feared opening any other passage for him on a front that extended almost 250 kilometers. Furthermore, he did not see the possibility of maintaining his troops on the other side of the mountains, practically cut off from Tunja and the capital. He therefore chose to wait, while alarming and contradictory reports arrived such as one that informed that Bolívar was going to meet Páez in Píedecuesta. He tried to gather, as far as the security of the Kingdom allowed, several detachments of his army, stationed at widely dispersed points.[29] Finally, on July 5 he received news that 500 cattle were led from Paya to Pisba and on the 6th, that the enemy army had moved towards the moor towards Pisba and Socotá. When Bolivar had arrived in Socha on July 6 his army was in a weaknened state and at its most vulnerable, however Barreiro preferred to stay garrisoned and concentrate his forces that had been dispersed throughout the region in Tunja at the time. Viceroy Samano grew frustrated with this approach and decided to relieve Barreiro of his command and replace him with Colonel Sebastian de la Calzada, who was commander of the 400 strong European Aragon Battalion which guarded Santa Fe, as commander of the III Division.[30] Barreiro however refused this order as it would "Stain his honor as a military officer" and also told the Viceroy that only General Pablo Morillo had the authority to relieve him of his command, he ordered de la Calzada to return to Santa Fe.[31]

During this time Bolivar remained near Socha as he began to rebuild his weakened army, this was aided with the support of the local people of the Tunja Province (now Boyaca Department) who sewed uniforms, provided men for the army, as well as horses to replace the losses suffered during the crossing of the Paramo.[32] The support of the local people for the Patriot Army had been noted by the Royalist officials, with Barreiro complaining about this in his communications with Viceroy Samano. While the bulk of the army rested for 4 days in Socha, Bolivar dispatched Santander's Vanguard force to take control of the nearby towns of Corrales and Gameza, Gameza in partiicular was important as there was a bridge there that crosses the Gameza river which was swollen during this time of year. On July 7 this vanguard force engaged in small skirmishes with patrolling Royalist squads dispatched from Sogamoso by the local Spanish commander Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Gonzalez. As reports of the Patriot troops taking nearby towns reached Gonzalez he decided to fall back from Sogamoso toward Tunja.

Corrales and Gameza - 10 July

On July 8, Barreiro after hearing about the Patriot presence near Corrales and Gameza finally moved his army in the direction towards Sogamoso where he was joined by Gonzalez, arriving there on the night of July 9. The next morning July 10 he ordered his troops to conduct reconnosance in the area of the towns of Corrales and Gameza, to Corrales he dispatched 30 men under the command of Lieutenant Manuel Gutierrez and to Gameza a company of grenadiers of the King's 1st Battalion as well as some dragoons numbering 200. [33]Lieutenant Gutierrez's troops who were near Corrales enocuntered 20 Patriot Cavalry, Gutierrez ordered his men to chase after them where they were subsequently ambushed by 300 Patriots under the command of Colonel Justo Briceno who were hiding in nearby buildings, as a result of this action the Royalist squad was decimated with only Gutierrez and 4 dragoons managing to escape, the force that had been deployed to Gameza was also forced to withdraw.

As a result of these circumstances Barreiro advanced along the banks of the Chicamocha River where set up his HQ in a place known as Molinos de Topaga, once there he sent reinforcements in order to support his forces near Corrales as well sending reinforcements to Gameza.[34] These reinforcements pushed back the Patriot advances, with the Patriot Cavalry being chased down by Spanish forces past the town of Corrales where they were forced to throw themselves into the river in order to escape the Spanish with 20 men dead and 5 captured in the process while Patriot infantry was almost entirely wiped out. With this Barreiro achieved a partial victory of which he informed the Viceroy about in his letter. After the battle a large group of Patriot prisoners were tied up in a group and executed by bayonet on the orders of Barreiro to conserve ammuniton.[35]

Gameza Bridge - 11 July

After the battle of Corrales, on July 11 Barreiro deployed around 900 infantry and 180 cavalry to take Gameza bridge, this force marched on the morning of July 11 from Molinos de Topaga. The Spanish vanguard force was dispatched ahead crossed the bridge over the Gámeza River and continued the ascent of the slope where the town is located.

The uniform of a Patriot Soldier of the Cazadores Constantes de la Nueva Granada infantry battalion

Barreiro, who was marching at the head of the main group, observed when he arrived near the bridge that a column was coming from the top of the mountain, above the town. He immediately ordered the Numancia battalion to halt their positions. He then saw that the other columns were coming down, apparently to attack the royalist force. He estimated the enemy at 2,000 infantry and 150 cavalry divided into five columns. These forces were the vanguard and rearguard divisions of Santander and Anzoátegui, that is, the entire Patriot Army.[36] Barreiro considering that the Numancia battalion could be cut off from retreating along the river, ordered its unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Tolrá, to withdraw his battalion to the left bank, that is, behind the bridge, taking into account the direction of the river. Bolivar saw this movement, and ordered the Cazadores Battalion as well as a company from each of the Rifles, Barcelona and Bravos of Páez battalions to charge the royalists.[37] This led both the patriots and royalists, to take defensive positions on both sides of the river with both attempting to cross each others sides various times to no avail, the battle lasted between 5 and 8 hours with neither able to cross both armies withdrew to their previous positions. As a result of the battle the Patriots suffered 180 casaulties with Santander himself being lightly wounded as well Colonel Antonio Arriendo being mortally wounded and dying a few days later leading his second in command Joaquin Paris being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and being given command of the Cazadores Battalion. [38][39]The Royalists suffered 74 casaulties, both sides expended a large amount of ammuntion during the battle with the Spanish having expended 35,000 Paper cartridges (39 shots per soldiers) which made Barreiro request more ammuntion from the Viceroy.[40][41]

Vargas Swamp - 25 July

After the results of the Battle of Gameza, Bolivar changed his strategy disregarding his initial plan for a frontal assault on Sogamoso and instead opting for a flanking manuevour through Cerinza Valley. This movement caused Barreiro to fall back towards the town of Paipa where he hoped to intercept him. By 22 July the British Legion had finally crossed Páramo de Pisba and rejoined the army, the Patriot army now numbered around 2,400 men. Bolivar now at full strength, still aimed to reach the capital Santa Fe through the main Camino Real, however he would need to cross the swollen Chicamocha River in order to do this. On 23 July the Patriot army began building rafts to ford the river, these would be completed by late 24 July. On the early hours of July 25 the Patriot Army attempted to cross the Chicamocha River near an area called Puente de Balsa, this crossing would be complicated by the collapse of some of the rafts delaying the army significantly. Spies in the vicinity informed Barreiro of this, Barreiro camped in Paipa now knew Bolivar intended to take the road from Salitre and Paipa. The Royalist Army was able to muster 1,800 men as troops from the surrounding areas finally rejoined the bulk of the army. Barreiro moved quickly to place his troops on favorable ground in area near Vargas Swamp that served as a chokepoint between the Salitre to Paipa road arriving there at 11am. The Patriot Army arrived at 12pm and immediately did battle with the Royalist Army. The Battle of Vargas Swamp lasted 5 hours as the Patriot Army tried repeatedly to dislodge the Spanish from their positions on Picacho Hill and Cangrejo Hill. Time and time again the Royalists were able to hold off and push back the Patriots. Around 5pm the Patriots began to fall back in disarray, Barreiro committed his reserve infantry and cavalry for a frontal assault in tandem with a flanking maneuver in order to encircle the patriots to finish them off. Bolivar in an act of desperation committed his reserve cavalry under the command of Colonel Juan José Rondón who led an uphill charge with 14 lancers that managed to penetrate the Spanish line on Cangrejo Hill. Rondón's charge caught the Spanish off guard as the Hussars of Ferdinand VII had dismounted to support the infantry. Rondón charge was followed by an infantry attack by Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Infante that finally dislodged the Spanish forces off of Cangrejo Hill. At the same time Santander Vanguard along with the British Legion under Rooke force led a renewed bayonet charge up Picacho Hill which dislodged the Spanish forces there as well, however Rooke would be mortally wounded as a result of the charge dying a few days later. While the Royalists had been pushed back, their forces were mostly intact and were able to avoid further destruction thanks to a tropical rainstorm that covered their withdrawal towards Paipa. The Patriot army also withdrew to the Chicamocha River. This uphill battle for Bolivar was a close victory however it was indecisive as neither side decimated the other. Both armies suffered heavy loses with Barreiro suffering around 400-500 dead and Bolivar 300 dead as well numerous wounded. This would be the bloodiest battle of the campaign.

Boyacá

After the Battle of Vargas Swamp, Bolivar's army had been left nonoperational, as a result he decreed martial law in the area on 28 July and conscripted all men from the ages 14 to 60 to rebuild his force, he rested them until 4 August, when he ordered a return to Venezuela. However, during the night, he redirected his forces towards Tunja, and took the city by mid-day of 5 August 1819. Due to Bolivar's flash conquest, Barreiro was obliged to mobilize his troops to defend the capital, Santafé, from Bolivar.[citation needed] The Royalist men took the fastest route to Bogota (which led through the Boyacá Bridge), but were unable to pass, as Bolivar intercepted them in the early morning of 7 August. Bolivar's republican troops were composed of approximately 2,850 men, which successfully divided and defeated the 2,670 royalist soldiers in a battle that lasted two hours.[citation needed] The battle resulted in the death of 66 republicans, 250 royalists, as well as the capture of approximately 1,600 of the remaining royal troops.[citation needed] At the Battle of Boyacá on 7 August 1819, the bulk of the royalist army surrendered to Bolívar.

On the day of the battle of Boyacá, Colonel Barrerio (leader of the royalist forces in Nueva Granada) was captured alongside 37 Spanish officers. The 38 prisoners were executed on 11 October 1819 by decree of Francisco de Paula Santander, staying true to Bolivar's motto of 'war to the death.' On receiving the news, the viceroy, Juan José de Sámano, and the rest of royalist government fled the capital to Cartagena de Indias, leaving behind the treasury. On the afternoon of 10 August Bolívar's army entered Bogotá without any royalist resistance.[42][43][44] His arrival concluded the campaign for liberating New Granada. The battle of Boyacá was a decisive triumph over Spanish power in New Granada, and the Spanish America as a whole.[citation needed] Despite the royalists' strength in the other provinces of the region, such as Santa Marta and Pasto – where resistance withstood various years of revolutionary uprisings – the capital of the viceroyalty of New Granada had fallen into the hands of the New Granadans.

Political ramifications

With New Granada secure, Bolívar returned to Venezuela in a position of unprecedented military, political and financial strength.[citation needed] In his absence, the Congress had flirted with deposing him, assuming that he would meet his death in New Granada.[citation needed] The vice-president Francisco Antonio Zea was deposed and replaced by Juan Bautista Arismendi. All this was quickly reversed when word got to the Congress of Bolívar's success. In December Bolívar returned to Angostura, where he urged the Congress to proclaim the creation of a new state: the Republic of Colombia (Gran Colombia). It did so on 17 December and elected him president of the new country. Since two of its three regions, Venezuela and Quito (Ecuador), were still under royalist control, it was only a limited achievement.[45][46][47] Bolívar continued his efforts against the royalist areas of Venezuela, culminating in the Battle of Carabobo two years later, which all but secured his control of northern South America.[citation needed] Bolívar's victory in New Granada was, therefore, a major turning point in the history of northern South America.[citation needed] With this shift in political power, the path was laid out for the union of New Granada and Venezuela into the Republic of Colombia.[citation needed] However, the campaigns for independence would continue: Antonio José de Sucre marched South, towards Pasto, the Audiencia de Quito, the Viceroyalty of Peru, and Upper Peru, while Bolivar sought to expand the campaign to the westernmost regions of Venezuela, which still lay under Spanish power, and counted with 27,000 soldiers for its defense.[citation needed]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Masur, Gerhard. Simon Bolivar, 273.
  2. ^ Mijares, Augusto. The Liberator, 354.
  3. ^ Albi de la Cuesta, Julio (2019) p.383
  4. ^ Moreno de Angel, Pilar (2019) [1989]. Santander (in Spanish) (1st ed.). Bogotá: Crítica Colombia. p. 400. ISBN 9789584276926.
  5. ^ Gutiérrez Ardila, Daniel (2019). 1819: Campaña de la Nueva Granada (1st ed.). Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. p. 61. ISBN 978-958-790-122-1.
  6. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 116-119.
  7. ^ Albi de la Cuesta, Julio (2019) p.384
  8. ^ Lynch, John. Bolívar, A Life, 124–127.
  9. ^ Masur, Gerhard. Simon Bolivar, 261–264.
  10. ^ Madariaga, Salvador de. Bolívar, 339–343.
  11. ^ Gutiérrez Ardila, Daniel. 1819: campaña de la Nueva Granada: 61-62
  12. ^ Riaño, Camilo , La Campaña Libertadora de 1819 , p. 152
  13. ^ Harvey, Robert. Liberators: Latin America's Struggle for Independence: 176.
  14. ^ a b Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 153.
  15. ^ Lynch, John. Bolívar, A Life, 127–129.
  16. ^ Masur, Gerhard. Simon Bolivar, 264–266.
  17. ^ Madariaga, Salvador de. Bolívar, 343–348.
  18. ^ a b Harvey, Robert. Liberators: Latin America's Struggle for Independence: 177.
  19. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819: 160.
  20. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819: 162.
  21. ^ Harvey, Robert, Liberators Latin America's Struggle for Independence p.178
  22. ^ Gutierrez Ardila, Daniel (2019) p. 57
  23. ^ Riaño, Camilo, La Campaña Libertadora de 1819 p. 163
  24. ^ Gutiérrez Ardila, Daniel. 1819: campaña de la Nueva Granada: 62.
  25. ^ Moreno de Angel, Pilar. Santander: 417.
  26. ^ Gutierrez Ardila, Daniel (2019) p. 59
  27. ^ Moreno de Angel, Pilar (1989) p. 414
  28. ^ Friede Alter, Juan (1969) p. 34
  29. ^ Friede Alter, Juan (1969) p. 35
  30. ^ Albi de la Cuesta, Julio (2019) p.386
  31. ^ Friede Alter, Juan (1969) p.99-100. Carta de Barreiro a Samano 8 de Julio 1819 Tunja [Letter from Barreiro to Samano 8 July 1819, Tunja]
  32. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 167-168
  33. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 180
  34. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 182
  35. ^ Gutierrez Ardilia, Daniel (2019) p.68
  36. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 188
  37. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 189
  38. ^ Moreno de Angel, Pilar (1989) p. 421-422
  39. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 191
  40. ^ Gutierrez Ardila, Daniel. p. 69
  41. ^ Riaño, Camilo. La Campaña Libertadora de 1819, 192
  42. ^ Lynch, John. Bolívar, A Life, 129–130.
  43. ^ Masur, Gerhard. Simon Bolivar, 266-73.
  44. ^ Madariaga, Salvador de. Bolívar, 357–358.
  45. ^ Lynch, John. Bolívar, A Life, 132–134.
  46. ^ Masur, Gerhard. Simon Bolivar, 274–275, 280–285.
  47. ^ Madariaga, Salvador de. Bolívar, 353–354, 361–364.

References

  • Albi de la Cuesta, Julio (2019). Banderas olivdadas: El Ejército español en las guerras de Emancipación de América [Forgotten Banners: The Spanish Army during the wars of American Empancipation] (in Spanish) (1st ed.). Madrid: Desperta Ferro Ediciones SLNE. ISBN 978-84-121687-1-6.
  • Friede Alter, Juan (1969) La Batalla de Boyacá: 7 de agosto de 1819 a través de los archivos españoles. Bogotá: Banco de la República.
  • Gutiérrez Ardila, Daniel (2019). 1819: campaña de la Nueva Granada. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. ISBN 978-958-790-122-1.
  • Riaño, Camilo (1969) La Campaña Libertadora de 1819 [Liberation Campaign of 1819]. Bogotá: Ediitorial Andes.
  • Lynch, John (2006). Simón Bolívar. A Life, New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-11062-6.
  • Masur, Gerhard (1969). Simón Bolívar (Revised edition). Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
  • Moreno de Ángel, Pilar (1989) Santander. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta. ISBN 9789584276926
  • Harvey, Robert. "Liberators: Latin America`s Struggle For Independence, 1810–1830". John Murray, London (2000). ISBN 0-7195-5566-3
  • Madariaga, Salvador de. (1952). Bolívar. Westport: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-313-22029-6
  • Mijares, Augusto (1983). The Liberator. Caracas: North American Association of Venezuela.
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