Existential generalization

Existential generalization
TypeRule of inference
FieldPredicate logic
StatementThere exists a member x {\displaystyle x} in a universal set with a property of Q {\displaystyle Q}
Symbolic statement Q ( a )   x Q ( x ) , {\displaystyle Q(a)\to \ \exists {x}\,Q(x),}
Transformation rules
Propositional calculus
Rules of inference
  • Implication introduction / elimination (modus ponens)
  • Biconditional introduction / elimination
  • Conjunction introduction / elimination
  • Disjunction introduction / elimination
  • Disjunctive / hypothetical syllogism
  • Constructive / destructive dilemma
  • Absorption / modus tollens / modus ponendo tollens
  • Negation introduction
Rules of replacement
  • Associativity
  • Commutativity
  • Distributivity
  • Double negation
  • De Morgan's laws
  • Transposition
  • Material implication
  • Exportation
  • Tautology
Predicate logic
Rules of inference
  • Universal generalization / instantiation
  • Existential generalization / instantiation

In predicate logic, existential generalization[1][2] (also known as existential introduction, ∃I) is a valid rule of inference that allows one to move from a specific statement, or one instance, to a quantified generalized statement, or existential proposition. In first-order logic, it is often used as a rule for the existential quantifier ( {\displaystyle \exists } ) in formal proofs.

Example: "Rover loves to wag his tail. Therefore, something loves to wag its tail."

Example: "Alice made herself a cup of tea. Therefore, Alice made someone a cup of tea."

Example: "Alice made herself a cup of tea. Therefore, someone made someone a cup of tea."

In the Fitch-style calculus:

Q ( a )   x Q ( x ) , {\displaystyle Q(a)\to \ \exists {x}\,Q(x),}

where Q ( a ) {\displaystyle Q(a)} is obtained from Q ( x ) {\displaystyle Q(x)} by replacing all its free occurrences of x {\displaystyle x} (or some of them) by a {\displaystyle a} .[3]

Quine

According to Willard Van Orman Quine, universal instantiation and existential generalization are two aspects of a single principle, for instead of saying that x x = x {\displaystyle \forall x\,x=x} implies Socrates = Socrates {\displaystyle {\text{Socrates}}={\text{Socrates}}} , we could as well say that the denial Socrates Socrates {\displaystyle {\text{Socrates}}\neq {\text{Socrates}}} implies x x x {\displaystyle \exists x\,x\neq x} . The principle embodied in these two operations is the link between quantifications and the singular statements that are related to them as instances. Yet it is a principle only by courtesy. It holds only in the case where a term names and, furthermore, occurs referentially.[4]

See also

References

  1. ^ Copi, Irving M.; Cohen, Carl (2005). Introduction to Logic. Prentice Hall.
  2. ^ Hurley, Patrick (1991). A Concise Introduction to Logic 4th edition. Wadsworth Publishing. ISBN 9780534145156.
  3. ^ pg. 347. Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, Language proof and logic Second Ed., CSLI Publications, 2008.
  4. ^ Willard Van Orman Quine; Roger F. Gibson (2008). "V.24. Reference and Modality". Quintessence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. OCLC 728954096. Here: p.366.


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