Rowan v. United States Post Office Department

1970 United States Supreme Court case
Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Dept.
Argued January 22, 1970
Decided May 4, 1970
Full case nameDaniel Rowan, dba American Book Service, et al., Appellants, v. United States Post Office Department, et al.
Citations397 U.S. 728 (more)
90 S. Ct. 1484; 25 L. Ed. 2d 736; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 44
Case history
Prior300 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1969); probable jurisdiction noted, 396 U.S. 885 (1969).
Holding
The addressee of postal mail has unreviewable discretion to decide whether to receive further material from a particular sender, and a vendor does not have a constitutional right to send unwanted material to an unreceptive addressee.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · William O. Douglas
John M. Harlan II · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall
Case opinions
MajorityBurger, joined by unanimous
ConcurrenceBrennan, joined by Douglas
Laws applied
39 U.S.C. § 4009
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department

Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that an addressee of postal mail has sole, complete, unfettered and unreviewable discretion to decide whether he or she wishes to receive further material from a particular sender, and that the sender does not have a constitutional right to send unwanted material into someone's home. It thus created a quasi-exception to free speech in cases in which a person is held as a "captive audience".[1]

Background

While the statute only explicitly applies to "a pandering advertisement which offers for sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative", a lower court had found that § 4009 was constitutional when interpreted to prohibit advertisements similar to those initially mailed to the addressee, and this decision upholds that interpretation. In other words, a recipient may obtain a Prohibitory Order prohibiting mail from a given sender, and the mailing used as the basis for that order need not be erotic or sexually provocative in order to be the basis of prohibiting the sender from sending further mail. The only absolute requirement is that it must be possible to construe the mail as an offer to sell goods or services.

Opinion of the Court

The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Warren Burger, and a concurring opinion was filed by Justice William Brennan, joined by William Douglas. The majority concluded that the addressee of postal mail has sole, complete, unfettered and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to receive further material from a particular sender, and a vendor does not have a constitutional right to send unwanted material to an unreceptive addressee.

Subsequent developments

The United States Postal Service's PS Form 1500 still refers to material that the applicant considers "erotically arousing or sexually provocative" even though the court interpreted the statute to apply to any unwanted advertising: "The statute allows the addressee sole, complete, unfettered and unreviewable discretion to decide whether he wishes to receive any further material from a particular sender."

See also

  • flagUnited States portal
  • iconLaw portal
  • Freedom of speech portal

References

  • Volokh, Eugene (2008). The First Amendment and Related Statutes. Foundation Press.

Notes

  1. ^ Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA Law Review 1791 (1992), excerpted with substantial modifications.

External links

  • Text of Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) is available from: Cornell  CourtListener  Google Scholar  Justia  Library of Congress  Oyez (oral argument audio) 
  • v
  • t
  • e
Public displays
and ceremonies
Statutory religious
exemptions
Public funding
Religion in
public schools
Private religious speech
Internal church affairs
Taxpayer standing
Blue laws
Other
Exclusion of religion
from public benefits
Ministerial exception
Statutory religious exemptions
RFRA
RLUIPA
Unprotected
speech
Incitement
and sedition
Libel and
false speech
Fighting words and
the heckler's veto
True threats
Obscenity
Speech integral
to criminal conduct
Strict scrutiny
Vagueness
Symbolic speech
versus conduct
Content-based
restrictions
Content-neutral
restrictions
In the
public forum
Designated
public forum
Nonpublic
forum
Compelled speech
Compelled subsidy
of others' speech
Compelled representation
Government grants
and subsidies
Government
as speaker
Loyalty oaths
School speech
Public employees
Hatch Act and
similar laws
Licensing and
restriction of speech
Commercial speech
Campaign finance
and political speech
Anonymous speech
State action
Official retaliation
Boycotts
Prisons
Prior restraints
and censorship
Privacy
Taxation and
privileges
Defamation
Broadcast media
Copyrighted materials
Incorporation
Protection from prosecution
and state restrictions
Organizations
Future Conduct
Solicitation
Membership restriction
Primaries and elections


Stub icon

This article related to the Supreme Court of the United States is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.

  • v
  • t
  • e